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IN RE QUINLAN: ONE COURT'S ANSWER TO THE
PROBLEM OF DEATH WITH DIGNITY
On the night of April 15, 1975, Karen Ann Quinlan, aged 22,
lapsed into a coma from which she still has not emerged.' On Septem-
ber 10, 1975, her father applied to the Chancery division of the Supe-
rior Court of New Jersey for letters of guardianship with the express
power to authorize "the discontinuance of all extraordinary means of
sustaining the vital processes of his daughter .. ."I This request
was strenuously opposed by Karen's doctors, the hospita in which
she was being treated, the county prosecutor, Karen's guardian ad
litem, and the state of New Jersey, which had intervened on the basis
of a state interest in the preservation of life.3
Bergen County Record, Nov. 5, 1976, at A-1, col. 3.
2 1 IN THE MATTER OF KAREN QUINLAN 3 (1975). A subsequent amendment to the
complaint sought to restrain Karen's attending physicians and her hospital from inter-
fering with any such exercise of authority and to enjoin any criminal prosecution
against any party should Karen's death result. Id. at 14. For a compilation of all of'
the trial court proceedings, transcripts, affidavits, briefs, and decision of In re Quin-
lan, see 1 IN THE MATTER OF KAREN QUINLAN (1975). For a similar compilation of the
supreme court proceedings, see 2 IN THE MATTER OF KAREN QUINLAN (1976).
On appeal, the state supreme court upheld the state's right to intervene, citing
the Declaration of Independence, the United States Constitution, and the New Jersey
Constitution for the proposition that the state's interest in life has "an undoubted
constitutional foundation." In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 652 (1976). The
state constitution provides for state protection of "certain natural and unalienable
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life. N.J. CONsT. art.
I, par. 1.
Apart from the specific New Jersey constitutional provision, the right of a state
as parens patriae to intervene for the purpose of preserving or protecting life appears
to be well settled. The intervention usually is justified on the ground that the state
has a special duty both to represent society's concern for human life and to help an
incompetent or otherwise disabled person to make a vital decision concerning his
welfare. In re Weberlist, 79 Misc.2d 753, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783 (Sup. Ct. 1974). In Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973), the Supreme Court held that the state interest as to
protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life was legitimate and sufficient
to limit the right of a woman to receive an abortion. See generally Note, Compulsory
Medical Treatment: The State's Interest Reevaluated, 51 MINN. L. REv. 293 (1966).
Statutes requiring motorcyclists to wear crash helmets are examples of legislation
promoting this state interest. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-289(e)(West 1970).
There is, however, a split in authority as to the constitutionality of these laws. See
Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 1270 (1970). For other instances of the assertion of the state's
interest in protecting life, see Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972
(1942) (state statute forbidding use of handling of snakes in religious rituals upheld);
Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FORD. L. REv.
1, 7 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Byrn].
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The trial court found that Karen's coma was the result of anoxia4
and subsequent decortication5 which left the patient in a chronic and
persistent vegetative state' and totally dependent upon a mechanical
respirator for breathing.7 Nonetheless, the trial court denied the
plaintiff's application.' On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
unanimously reversed, holding that Karen was not legally or medi-
cally dead' and that her constitutional right of privacy10 was broad
"Anoxia" is defined as "[d]ecreased amount of oxygen in organs and tissues,
i.e., less than the physiologically normal amount .. " STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 77 (22d Ed. 1972). Karen had ceased breathing for at least two 15-minute
periods before receiving aid. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 654 (1976).
Cerebral decortication is total or partial destruction of an external layer of brain
tissue on the surface of the cerebral hemisphere, usually brought about by anoxia.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 326 (22d Ed. 1972).
A patient in a chronic and persistent vegetative state was defined by an expert
medical witness at trial as a "subject who remains with the capacity to maintain the
vegetative parts of neurological function but who. . .no longer has any cognitive func-
tion." Karen experienced no awareness of her environment, and had a fetal-like pos-
ture with extreme flexion-rigidity of her muscles. She was able only to move, grimace,
and make stereotyped sounds. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 654-655 (1976).
1 At the time of trial, the testifying physicians believed that Karen could not
survive without assistance of the respirator and that if it was removed death would
soon follow. Id. at 655. Karen has been transferred from the intensive care unit at the
hospital to the New Jersey state rest home, and since May 22, 1976 has been breathing
without the aid of a respirator. Bergen County Record, Nov. 5, 1976, at A-1, col. 3.
" In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 269-70, 348 A.2d 801, 824 (Ch. 1975).
' The trial court's pretrial order contained a "factual and legal contention" by the
plaintiff that under New Jersey law, Karen was legally dead. At trial, this contention
was discarded by a stipulated amendment to the order to the effect that Karen was
alive. The supreme court found this amendment to be supported by medical evidence,
and affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant a request by Karen's hospital to deter-
mine whether the use of criteria developed by the Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard
Medical School to determine when a patient is dead is in accordance with standard
medical practice. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 652-3 (1976). Although the
court dismissed the request as not ripe for adjudication, it nevertheless applied the Ad
Hoc standards to determine that Karen was not brain dead. The four main standards
are: unreceptivity and unresponsitivity to applied stimuli, no spontaneous respiration
or movements, no elicitable reflexes, and a "flat" electroencephalogram. These tests
are conducted twice, the second repeated at least 24 hours after the first. To be conclu-
sive, the results of both tests must be the same. If all test responses are negative, the
Ad Hoc Committee recommends that, upon decision of the attending physician,
"[d]eath is to be declared and then the respirator turned off." Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee of Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death: A
Definition of "Irreversible Coma," 205 J.A.M.A. 337, 338 (1968). See generally Char-
ron, Death: A Philosophical Perspective on the Legal Definitions, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q.
979; H. van Till- d'Aulnis de Bourouill, Diagnosis of Death in Comatose Patients under
Resuscitation Treatment: A Critical Review of the Harvard Report, 2 AM. J. oF L. AND
MED. 1 (1976).
Although the supreme court did not hold that Karen was brain dead, it indicated
that her condition offered almost no hope for recovery:
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enough to encompass a decision to decline medical treatment in the
face of overwhelming medical evidence establishing an extreme unli-
kelihood that she will return to a cognitive or sapient existence." The
court also held that because Karen's incompetency prevented her
conscious exercise of this right, her guardian would be allowed, based
on his best judgment as to how she would exercise her right under the
circumstances, to decide whether the life-sustaining procedures
should be removed. In addition to this substantial expansion and
delineation of the right of privacy, the Quirlan decision redefined the
spheres of judicial and medical responsibility in situations relating to
the sustainment of life by artificial means.
1 2
The plaintiff presented three theories upon which a decision to
grant his request to remove Karen's life-support apparatus could be
based. First, he urged that the right of privacy included the right of
an individual to refuse "to submit to medical treatment which offers
No form of treatment which can cure or improve that condition is
known or available. As nearly as may be determined, considering the
guarded area of remote uncertainties characteristic of most medical
science predictions, she can never be restored to cognitive or sapient
life.
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 655 (1976). For a definition of the terms
cognitive or sapient, see note 11 infra.
11 For treatment of the development of the right of privacy, see Forkosch, Privacy,
Human Dignity, Euthanasia-Are These Independent Constitutional Rights?, 3 U.
SAN FERN. L. REV. 1 (No. 2 1974); Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Hufstedler,
The Directions and Misdirections of a Constitutional Right of Privacy, 26 THE REC.
OF THE A. OF THE B. OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 546 (1971).
" In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 671 (1976). The terms "cognitive or
sapient" are not medical but psychological, and refer to the ability of human beings
to behave purposefully in response to perceived and remembered environmental de-
mands. 2 IN THE MATTER OF KAREN QUINLAN at p. xi (1976) (introduction by D. R.
Robinson).
12 The sheer volume of prior medical and legal literature relating to euthanasia,
compulsory lifesaving treatment, and the prolonging of life by artificial means necessi-
tates restriction of the scope of this comment to a specific analysis of the Quinlan case
itself, without extended theoretical discussion of the problem in general. For a broad
overview, see A. DOwNING, EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DATH (1969); 0. RUSSELL,
FREEDOM TO DIE: MORAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF EUTHANASIA (1975); S. SHINDELL, THE
LAW IN MEDICAL PRACTICE (1966); G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL
LAW (1957); Byrn, supra note 3; Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving
Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus The Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L.
REV. 228 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Cantor]; Delgado, Euthanasia Reconsi-
dered-The Choice of Death as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 474
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Delgado]; Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against
Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 969 (1958); Sharpe & Hargest,
Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling Patients, 36 FORD L. REV. 695 (1968); Comment,
The Right to Die, 10 CALIF. WEST. L. REv. 613 (1974). This listing is not comprehensive.
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no hope of relief or cure."' 3 The plaintiff argued that such a right
belonged to the class of personal freedoms first given protection by
the United States Supreme Court in Union Pacific Railway v.
Botsford'4 and more recently characterized in Griswold v.
'1 Brief for Appellant, 2 IN THE MATrER OF KAREN QUINLAN 1, 16 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
14 141 U.S. 250 (1891). In Botsford, the defendant had brought a personal injury
action against the railroad, which then had sought an order compelling her to undergo
a physical examination in advance of trial. In affirming the lower court's refusal to
issue the order, the Court said that "no right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law." Id. at 251. While physical examination
of parties in actions in federal courts is now generally allowed under FED. R. Civ. P.
35, this fact should not alter the applicability of the Botsford rationale to cases involv-
ing the refusal to accept medical care.
Botsford did not rely on any constitutional base. Rather, it elucidated a common
law right of bodily self-determination that allows every person ultimate control over
his body. This right is invoked most commonly in tort cases granting relief to patients
on whom medical personnel have operated against their wishes. The most famous of
these is Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914), where
former Judge Cardozo stated that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon
who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which
he is liable in damages." Id. at 93. See also Natanson V'\ Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d
1093 (1960); Pearl v. Lesnick, 20 App. Div.2d 761, 247 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1st Dept. 1964),
aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 590, 224 N.E.2d 739, 278 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1967); Annot., 56 A.L.R. 2d
695 (1957). The patient's right of bodily determination also finds expression in the
doctrine of informed consent. Under this doctrine, a physician has an affirmative duty
to warn the patient of all material risks attendant upon a proposed course of treatment
so that the patient may make an informed decision to submit to or forego the treat-
ment. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1970); Cantor, supra note 12, at 237;
Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent", 36 FORD. L. REv. 639 (1968).
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme Court indicated that the right
of bodily self-determination is distinct from the right of privacy, and subject to legiti-
mate state limitation:
[It is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one
has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a
close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the
Court's decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited
right of this kind in the past.
Id. at 154 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court cited Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200
(1927) (state statute providing for the sexual sterilization of inmates of state institu-
tions who are afflicted with hereditary insanity or imbecility upheld) and Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (state statute providing for compulsory smallpox
vaccination of adults in accordance with city ordinances not violative of fourteenth
amendment) in support of this statement. See Byrn, supra note 3 at 6 n.31. The
plaintiff in In re Quinlan made no separate argument based on this common law right
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Connecticut" as "penumbral" to the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and
fourteenth amendments.
Second, the plaintiff argued that since the decision to seek author-
ization to remove Karen from the respirator was reached only after
months of prayerand counseling, it represented "a cooperation in
carrying out the Lord's will."" As such, it constituted a free exercise
of the plaintiffs religious beliefs and was protected by the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment. 7 In support of this argument,
the plaintiff cited a papal allocutio1" for the proposition that his re-
quest was neither prohibited by nor offensive to the tenets of his
family's faith, Roman Catholicism. Finally, Mr. Quinlan maintained
that to require Karen to be kept alive by extraordinary means "after
the dignity, beauty, promise, and meaning of earthly life have van-
ished"'" subjected Karen and her family to cruel and unusual punish-
ment in violation of the eighth amendment.2 '
of bodily self-determination, and the state supreme court did not distinguish it from
the asserted right of privacy. One must conclude that the court thought the two rights
substantially identical because counsel for plaintiff urged that "[i]t does not appear
necessary in the present circumstances to make a distinction between the right of
privacy and the right of self-determination." Brief for Appellant, supra note 13 at 13
n.3.
Is 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Court invalidated a Connecticut statute
prohibiting use of contraceptives by married couples and distribution of birth control
information and devices to them. Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas stated that
certain amendments have penumbras encompassing zones of privacy that are pro-
tected against governmental invasions. Only rights which are "fundamental" or "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty," however, are included within the penumbras
of personal privacy. Cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (where Justice
Cardozo formulated the "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" doctrine). The
Griswold Court held that the right to marital privacy is but another in a long line of
personal penumbral rights which have enjoyed judicial vindication. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contracep-
tion); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (communication); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (child r-earnig and education).
" Brief for Appellant, supra note 13, at 23.
, The first amendment reads in part that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. This amendment was held applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
1' Pope Pius XII, The Prolongation of Life, 4 PoPE SPEAKs 393 (1958). An allocutio
is an address given by the Pope and regarded as expositive of the official position of
the Church on a given issue.
, Brief fQr Appellant, supra note 13, at 27.
The eighth amendment provides that "[excessive bail shall not be required,
1977]
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The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the reasoning of the
trial court and summarily rejected the "free exercise of religion" and
"cruel and unusual punishment" arguments. With respect to the
former, the court concurred in the trial court's interpretation of the
papal allocutio1 as an essentially neutral proclamation that "it is
neither a mortal sin to continue nor discontinue 'extraordinary'
means of support for the body functions. 12 The supreme court rea-
soned that the impingement on religious beliefs or religious neutrality
in the face of the state's interest in the preservation of life did not
reflect a constitutional question,2 3 and that it would not recognize an
independent parental right of religious freedom to support the relief
requested.
24
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST., amend. VIII.
21 The allocutio concludes that "if it appears that the attempt at resuscitation
constitutes in reality such a burden for the family that one cannot in all conscience
impose it upon them, they can lawfully insist that the doctor should discontinue these
attempts, and the doctor can lawfully comply." Brief for Appellant, supra note 13, at
25.
2 137 N.J. Super. at 267, 348 A.2d at 823.
2: While the right to religious beliefs is absolute, actions in pursuance of those
beliefs are subject to regulation in furtherance of a legitimate state interest. Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). However, these interests must be of a compelling
and paramount nature before curtailment of religious liberty is allowed. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); West
Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
Such state interests are commonly found in cases where courts have ordered blood
transfusions for Jehovah's Witnesses, whose religious beliefs preclude them from con-
senting to such treatment. See Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 1391 (1966); Byrn, supra note 3;
Cantor, supra note 12; Ford, Refusal of Blood Transfusions by Jehovah's Witnesses,
10 CATmouc LAW. 212 (1964). Compelling interests include the safeguarding of the life
of a minor despite parental objection to treatment, People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz,
411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); State v. Perricone, 37
N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); the treating of a parent to
protect the interests of a minor dependent, Application of President and Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964);
the protection of an unborn child, Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v.
Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); respect for the
physician's conscience and professional oath, United States v. George, 239 F. Supp.
752 (D.C. Conn. 1965), but see Byrn supra note 3, at 29; and the state's general interest
in the preservation of life, John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576,
279 A.2d 670 (1970); see note 3 supra. These interests may also justify an infringement
of the right of privacy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Mr. Quinlan argued that no
such state interests were present in the case of his daughter.
1, 355 A.2d at 661-62. With regard to the independent parental claim of religious
belief, the trial court noted that parental standing to assert a constitutional claim
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In response to the plaintiff's eighth amendment argument,2 the
supreme court held that the cruel and unusual punishment clause did
not apply in the absence of the imposition of penal sanctions.28 The
court acknowledged that Karen was indeed subjected to cruel and
unusual conditions, but that since neither the state nor the law was
responsible for inflicting such conditions, the requisite element of
punishment was lacking.?
The supreme court, however, accepted the plaintiff's argument
that Karen's right of privacy included the right to die, thereby revers-
ing the holding of the lower court.2 8 Chief Justice Hughes reasoned
that this was a right within the penumbral rights defined by the
Supreme Court in Griswold,2 9 and analogized it to a woman's limited
right to receive an abortion." The court stated that "[p]resumably
[the right of privacy] is broad enough to encompass a patient's
relating to actions of children previously had been upheld only in instances dealing
with the future life conduct of the children. 137 N.J. Super. at 267, 348 A.2d at 823.
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (claim that application of state compul-
sory school-attendance law to Amish children violated parents' first amendment rights
upheld); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state statute compelling
children to attend public schools held violative of parents' right under fourteenth
amendment to direct the upbringing of their children). Since the parental claim in
Quinlan dealt with the ending of a child's life, and not the upbringing of the child,
the trial court declined to apply the Yoder and Pierce rationale to the situation before
it.
2 The plaintiff cited Justice Brennan's statement in his concurring opinion in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972), that "punishment is 'cruel and unusual'
if it does not comport with human dignity." The plaintiff contended that a constitu-
tional violation of the right could be found even in the absence of a state-imposed
criminal sanction. Brief for Appellant, supra note 13, at 26-27.
1355 A.2d at 662.
27 The supreme court's holding that the eighth amendment does not apply in the
absence of a penal sanction is well supported. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1957); Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CAUF. L. REv. 839 (1969).
71 The trial court rejected the plaintiff's privacy claim on two grounds. First, it
stated that since none of the right-of-privacy cases involved a claim which, if granted,
would lead to the individual's death, the compelling state interest found lacking in
those cases was present in the instant case in the form of the state's interest in preserv-
ing life. 137 N.J. Super. at 265, 348 A.2d at 822; see note 3 supra. Second, the court
held that the right of the patient could not be exercised by the parents, and noted that
the only cases in which such derivative exercises of a child's constitutional rights were
upheld were those involving "continuing life styles." 137 N.J. Super. at 266, 348 A.2d
at 822; see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 400 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
" See note 15 supra.
3 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
1977]
292 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances,
in much the same way as it is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision to terminate pregnancy under certain conditions."'3'
This analogy is not without foundation, since many of the same
arguments that support a right to terminate a pregnancy support an
individual's right to reject life-prolonging medical treatment. Both
are highly personal decisions that involve a physician's judgment and
advice. The possibilities of enormous financial expense, severe men-
tal or physical distress, and the violation of deeply felt ethical and
religious beliefs are attendant to both situations, at least when the
patient is not comatose." Finally and most importantly, the end
result of both decisions is the death of a human being or a potentially
living fetus. 33 Underlying these similarities are larger considerations
of social policy which accompany both abortion and euthanasia.3
In defining the "right to die", the Quinlan court balanced the
state's interest in preserving life against Karen's right of privacy.3 5
The court reasoned that an individual has a right to be free from
bodily invasion even if the intrusion is necessary to keep the patient
alive, unless the state's interest in preserving life can be said to be
superior to the individual's asserted claim of privacy. This depends
upon the likelihood of the patient recovering from his illness; if the
medical prognosis admits of no chance of recovery, the state's interest
is not compelling and will not outweigh the patient's right to refuse
11 355 A.2d at 663.
32 This analysis assumes that the patient is capable of feeling such distress. In the
case of a comatose subject such as Karen, no argument can be advanced that she felt
any distress or experienced any violation of her beliefs. This may account for the court
not discussing these specific factors in its opinion, although they remain important in
analyzing the general relationships between the right to abortion and the right to have
life-sustaining treatment removed.
3 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973), where the Court stated that the state
may assert its protective interest even when only potential life, in the form of a fetus,
is involved.
31 See Delgado, supra note 12, at 479. The issues of population growth and poverty
will come into play when a limited right to die is recognized. In light of the scarce and
expensive nature of medical facilities, the need to utilize costly hospital equipment and
space misallocates resources. Finally, an individual might choose to leave his personal
financial assets to his heirs and loved ones rather than deplete his funds in paying
doctors, hospitals, and other medical costs.
-1 In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973), the Court noted that since the state
may properly assert interests in safeguarding health, maintaining medical standards,
and protecting life, the right of privacy is not absolute. See also Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). Therefore, the limited nature of the right of privacy necessi-
tates a balancing of the legitimate state interests involved against the nature of the
right asserted by the individual.
DEATH WITH DIGNITY
or have withdrawn life-prolonging treatment." The court stated that
"the State's interest contra weakens and the individual's right to
privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prog-
nosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's
right overcomes the State interest.
3
Since Karen's prognosis was extremely poor and the degree of
bodily invasion, consisting of the respirator, intravenous feeding, and
antibiotics, was very great,38 the court concluded that the state's
interest was subordinated to her constitutional right.3 9 Chief Justice
Hughes distinguished the blood transfusion cases where the patient
was not allowed to reject treatment on the ground that "the medical
3' The test applied in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), to determine when a
mother may terminate the life of a fetus is similar to the test applied in Quinlan to
determine when a patient may refuse life-prolonging treatment. Both tests attempt to
define a point at which the state's interest becomes compelling, thereby barring exer-
cise of the individual's right of privacy. In Wade, the Court held that the state has a
compelling interest in preventing abortions when the fetus is viable and capable of
meaningful life outside of the mother. Similarly, the Quinlan court held that the
patient may not exercise his right to terminate care if there is a reasonable hope of
recovery. Since in both situations the state's interest is compelling when the fetus or
individual becomes capable of meaningful life, the two tests employ the same analysis,
and Wade supports the approach taken in Quinlan. See Note, The Tragic Choice:
Termination of Care For Patients in a Permanent Vegetative State, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
285, 291-92 (1976).
11 355 A.2d at 664. This analysis would seem sufficient to classify the state's
interest in preserving life as controlling in the context of an argument based on reli-
gious freedom, but not when the right of privacy is involved. In the latter case, the
type of invasion is tangible and physically intrusive upon the specific entity which is
to be protected-the human body. Such immediacy and acuity of bodily invasion is
not present when religious beliefs are offended. In qualitative terms, however, the
intrusion may be viewed as equally onerous.
3 The Attorney General of New Jersey has stated that the court's decision could
allow for the withdrawal of the artificial feeding apparatuses and antibiotic medication
that Karen is currently receiving, and does not apply only to the mechanical respirator
which was specified at trial as the prime life support. N.Y. Post, June 19, 1976, at 10,
col. 3. Since the court's holding authorized withdrawal of the "present life support
system," see text accompanying note 94 infra, intravenous feeding devices and certain
drugs could conceivably be included within the scope of the authorization. Cf. W.
NoLEN, A SURGEON'S WoRLD 279-80 (1972), where the author, a surgeon, stated: "Dis-
continuing the intravenous feedings and antibiotics, taking away the supports we use
to prop up a life, is one thing; doing something to shorten a life is quite another."
(quoted in Byrn supra note 3, at 28 n.129). Given that the components of a "life support
system" are defined by standard medical practice, presumably the treating and at-
tending physicians in the Quinlan case will make any final decision as to the extent of
the court's authorization subject to approval by an Ethics Committee. See text accom-
panying note 88 infra.
11 355 A.2d at 664.
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procedure required... constituted a minimal bodily invasion and
the chances of recovery and return to functioning life were very
good.
4N
Although Quinlan is the first case to hold that the right of privacy
includes the specific right to decline or withdraw vital life-support
treatment, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision is not without
some precedent. Other cases have recognized that an individual is
entitled to decide whether he is to receive medical treatment, even if
his refusal to submit to such treatment would lead to his death.
In re Yetter 4' concerned a 60 year old female inmate of a state
mental institution who refused to submit to a surgical biopsy to de-
termine whether she was afflicted with breast cancer. Without the
surgical procedures, death was likely but not imminent. The inmate's
brother petitioned for appointment as her guardian for the purpose
of consenting to the surgery, but the court refused to overrule the
patient's decision to forego treatment. Although Mrs. Yetter was suf-
fering from delusions about the problem, the Pennsylvania court
found her decision to be competently made, and held that "[t]he
right of privacy includes the right to die with which the State should
not interfere where there are no minor or unborn children and no clear
and present danger to public health, welfare or morals." 42 While the
Quinlan court did not apply a "clear and present danger" test, the
Yetter court's formulation of the right of privacy as encompassing the
right to die clearly presaged the constitutional analysis employed by
the New Jersey Supreme Court.
In In re Osborne43 the court refused to compel blood transfusions
to a Jehovah's Witness who had competently declined to consent to
them. Although the decision was based on the patient's claim of free
exercise of religion,44 a concurring judge noted that he thought the
40 Id.
1 62 Pa. D. & C. 2d 619 (C. P. Northampton County Ct. 1973).
42 Id. at 623 (emphasis added). A Jehovah's Witnesses' blood transfusion case, In
re Estate of Brooks, 32 lll.2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965), has been criticized for its
similar use of "a clear and present danger" test instead of the "compelling state
interest" test. 44 TEXAs L. REv. 190, 192-193 (1965). Yetter has been criticized for
employing a right of privacy rationale instead of the common law right of bodily self-
determination. See Byrn, supra note 3, at 5-10. See note 14 supra for a discussion of
the right of bodily self-determination.
43 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972).
" Id. at 375. The majority opinion rejected the argument accepted in Quinlan that
the state must have a compelling interest in sustaining life, stating that "[tihe notion
that the individual exists for the good of the state is, of course, quite antithetical to
our fundamental thesis that the role of the state is to ensure a maximum 6f individual
freedom of choice and conduct." Id. at n.5.
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opinion was grounded not only in religious freedom but also on a
broader based "freedom of choice." 5 As in Quinlan, the concurring
opinion did not differentiate between the right of privacy and the
right of bodily self-determination, nor did it indicate that either right
alone formed the basis of the theory of "freedom of choice."
In Palm Springs General Hospital, Inc. v. Martinez,46 a 72 year
old, terminally anemic woman refused to undergo surgery which
would have prolonged her life but offered no hope of a cure. When
her physician sought guidance as to his possible liability should he
allow the patient to die, the Florida court refused to compel Mrs.
Martinez to submit to the surgery. The patient made no objections
based on religion, and the court framed its narrow holding in terms
of a right to refuse medical treatment:
Based upon [her] debilitated physical condition. . .and the
fact that performance of surgery. . .would only result in the
painful extension of her life for a short period of time, it is not
in the interest of justice for this Court of Equity to order that
she be kept alive against her will. A conscious adult patient
who is mentally competent has the right to refuse medical
treatment, even when the best medical opinion deems it essen-
tial to save her life.
47
Martinez might be distinguished from the present case in that the
relative ages of Mrs. Martinez and Karen Quinlan provide a stronger
policy consideration towards allowing a very old woman to refuse life-
prolonging treatment while not granting the same relief to a younger
one. However, the Martinez court's reliance on the patient's poor
physical* condition and slight chance of recovery indicate that the
standard for granting relief closely resembled that employed in
Quinlan. Nevertheless, a distinction as to age should not be determi-
native if the younger patient's medical prognosis is equally as dim,
as it was in Quinlan.
" Id. at 376 (Yeagley, J., concurring).
' Civ. No. 71-12687 (Dade County Cir. Ct., filed July 2, 1971). TheMartinez case
is discussed in Byrn, supra note 3, at 13-14.
11 Palm Springs Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Martinez, Civ. No. 71-12687 (Dade County
Cir. Ct., filed July 2, 1971). Accord, In re Raasch, No. 455-996 (Milwaukee County Ct.,
filed Jan. 25, 1972), discussed in Sullivan, The Dying Person-His Plight and His
Right, 8 NEW ENGLAND L. Rav. 197 (1973). The court in Raasch dismissed a petition
for guardianship over a 78 year old woman who had competently refused to undergo a
leg amputation and other surgery necessary to prolong her life. As in Martinez, the
patient advanced no religious objections. She died three months after the dismissal of
the petition.
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In its discussion of precedent, the Quinlan court distinguished a
prior New Jersey case in concluding that Karen had a constitutional
right to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances. John
F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston" concerned a 22 year old
Jehovah's Witness who was severely injured in an automobile acci-
dent and taken to the plaintiff hospital, where doctors determined
that she would die if blood transfusions incident to a necessary opera-
tion were not administered. Both the patient and her mother refused
to consent to the treatment on religious grounds. 9 The hospital
sought, and was granted, a court order for appointment of a guardian
to consent to the transfusions."0 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
affirmed the appointment after the transfusions were made. Former
Chief Justice Weintraub observed that "[ilt seems correct to say
there is no constitutional right to choose to die. . . .Nor is [a] con-
stitutional right established by adding that one's religious faith or-
dains his death."'s The Heston court, however, was careful to point
out that it was not presented with a situation involving certain death,
and that the medical treatment contemplated promised a strong
chance of recovery. The situation, noted the court, would be different
when a terminally ill individual decides to let his illness run a fatal
course." The court in In re Quinlan concluded that Karen's case fell
into this latter category, and distinguished Heston on the sole ground
that the patient there was "salvable to long life and vibrant health."53
58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
, The court indicated that the competency of the patient to make an informed
decision was not clearly established, since despite Miss Heston's statements to the
contrary, the evidence showed that she was in shock and incoherent on admittance to
the hospital. 279 A.2d at 671.
" The lower court limited the forced transfusions to only the amount necessary
to preserve Miss Heston's life. Id.
Id. at 672.
52 Id. at 673. Since the Quinlan court was not faced with a situation in which a
terminal patient was asserting a very strong religious claim instead of a claim of
religious "neutrality," see text accompanying note 22 supra, its opinion would not
appear to foreclose the possibility left open in Heston of basing the right to die upon a
claim of religious freedom.
'0 355 A.2d at 663. The Quinlan court's manner of distinguishing Heston, there-
fore, seems to be consistent with its notion that in a given case the medical prognosis
must be very dim before the state's interest in preserving life will be subordinated to
the patient's right to choose to die. There is no mention in Heston of a right of privacy
or a prohibitive degree of bodily invasion. In any event, the facts of that case would
have made it exceedingly difficult to protect Miss Heston's claim of a right to die,
since in reality she made no such claim, and very much wanted to live. The patient
and her family were opposed only to the blood transfusions, not the required surgery.
279 A.2d at 673. See Byrn, supra note 3, at 17. Therefore, the court's broad statement
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In any event, under the Quinlan test of balancing the state's interest
in preserving life against the patient's medical prognosis and degree
of bodily invasion, the result in Heston would be justified, since the
patient's chance of recovery was very good and her degree of invasion
comparatively minimal.
The balancing processl which the New Jersey Supreme Court
utilized in Quinlan to decide when a person's claim of a right to die
supersedes the state's interest in protecting life presents one signifi-
cant difficulty. The crux of the problem is that the degree of bodily
invasion weighed against the state's interest in preserving life must
be measured in terms of the extent of treatment at the time of suit.
When the supreme court decided In re Quinlan,55 it could state that
the degree of bodily invasion was very great, since Karen required 24
hour intensive nursing care, antibiotics, a catheter, an intravenous
feeding apparatus, and a respirator. As a result of the decision, how-
ever, Karen was removed from her intensive care unit and "weaned"
from the respirator. 6 Nevertheless, she continued to live. While her
chances for recovery remained as minimal as always, the degree of
physical bodily invasion significantly decreased.
By weighing the degree of bodily invasion and the patient's slight
chance of recovery against the state's interest in preserving life, the
New Jersey court was forced to rely on a medical and factual setting
which was variable and unstable. This necessarily raises the question
whether with each change in the degree of bodily invasion the balanc-
ing test should be repeated. Initially, it would seem that under the
court's analysis this question must be answered in the affirmative,
and that in a case such as Karen's, where the life-support devices are
withdrawn pursuant to the patient's right and yet the patient contin-
ues to live, the decrease in bodily invasion makes the state's interest
in preserving life overriding even though the medical prognosis re-
mains dim. A distinction must be made, however, between a decrease
in bodily invasion because the patient exercised his constitutionally
protected right to refuse treatment and the decrease in bodily inva-
sion due to an improvement in the patient's condition. Only in the
latter situation should the balancing test be repeated and the de-
crease in bodily invasion be taken into account in determining
whether the state's interest in protecting the patient's life is control-
negating a constitutional right to choose to die should only be regarded as dictum
inapplicable to the very different facts in Quinlan.
'4 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
March 31, 1976.
N.Y. Times, June 10, 1976, at 31, col. 8.
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ling. Otherwise, the very exercise of the right to refuse or remove life-
prolonging treatment would serve to increase the state's interest and
prevent the patient who continues to live after the treatment is
removed from dying without interference, though the medical prog-
nosis remains continually hopeless.
For this reason, the predominant factor in gauging the state inter-
est should not be the degree of bodily invasion but the dimness of
the medical prognosis for recovery. As the Quinlan case illustrates, a
patient's ability eventually to perform simple bodily functions with-
out the aid of machines does not mean that her overall prognosis has
improved. Since the problem of a high degree of bodily invasion is
ancillary to the principal medical judgment that a patient has no
meaningful chance of recovery, the presence of a dim medical prog-
nosis should be determinative. If not, the delicate balancing of consti-
tutional right and legitimate state interest would be subject to revi-
sion as the degree of bodily invasion changes over time, and the entire
process would assume an undesirable degree of impermanence and
uncertainty.57
The supreme court also considered the problem of who was to
exercise Karen's right to reject life-prolonging treatment given her
obvious inability to do so. Chief Justice Hughes was clear as to
Karen's prerogative to exercise her right were she able, stating that
"if Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an interval. . .and per-
ceptive of her irreversible condition, she could effectively decide upon
discontinuance of the life-support apparatus, even if it meant the
prospect of natural death."5 Since no such lucidity appeared likely,
however, the court granted to her guardian the authority to exercise
this right.5" Although constitutional rights are personal in nature6
and therefore exercisable on behalf of the individual by a guardian, 6'
the vicarious exercise of a right of privacy raises problems because of
11 In addition to the uncertainty that this situation entails in the context of the
constitutional balancing test, it has practical effects on the defining of the areas of
medical and legal responsibility in cases such as Karen's. See text accompanying note
92 infra.
355 A.2d at 663.
5' Id. at 664.
" Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 594 (1942); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 161 (1939).
11 See R. MACKAY, GUARDIANSHIP LAw 52 (1948). In 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 49
(1945) it is stated that "[t]he incompetent being legally incapable of acting for him-
self, his guardian. . .acts for him, as his personal representative, and the. . .guardian
generally becomes substituted for his ward, with refer ince to all his interests." (foot-
notes omitted).
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the uniquely personal relation of this right to the individual himself.
The United States Supreme Court has considered the possibility
of a guardian's abuse of a child's constitutional right of religion, a
personal right whose exercise by another poses problems similar to
those encountered when the right of privacy is vicariously exercised.
In Prince v. Massachusetts,2 the Court upheld State laws regulating
the employment of children in the face of a constitutional attack by
a Jehovah's Witness who alleged that the laws impinged upon the
rightful exercise of her child's religious convictions. Mr. Justice Ru-
tledge noted that while parents are free to exercise their own rights
as they see fit, they are not free to exercise their children's rights to
their detriment, thereby making "martyrs of their children."63 While
Prince dealt with a parent's assertion of her child's right of free exer-
cise of religion, and not a guardian's assertion of his ward's right of
privacy, its rationale would seem to be important in the latter case,
especially when exercise of the ward's right presumably would lead
to his death. The Quinlan court, however, reasoned that to refuse
Karen's father the authority to exercise Karen's right of privacy
would effectively nullify the right altogether. The court stated:
If a putative decision by Karen to permit this noncognitive,
vegetative existence to terminate by natural forces is regarded
as a valuable incident of her right of privacy. . .then it should
not be discarded solely on the basis that her condition prevents
her conscious exercise of the choice. The only practical way to
prevent destruction of the right is to permit the guardian and
family of Karen to render their best judgment. . .as to
whether she would exercise it in these circumstances. 4
The quantum leap which permits Karen's guardian to exercise her
right to die is a large but necessary one. 5 Under the circumstances,
any judicial pronouncement which recognized Karen's right, but for-
-2 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
63 Id. at 170. See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The Eisenstadt
case involved a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives
to unmarried persons which was struck down on the grounds, inter alia, of a violation
of the right of privacy. The Court stated that "[i]f the right of privacy means any-
thing, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the deci-
sion whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453.
, 355 A.2d at 664.
,s Both the lower and appellate courts in Quinlan refused to recognize any of the
rights that Karen's parents asserted in their own right. See text accompanying notes
24 and 26 supra.
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bade its effectuation by anyone other than Karen would have given
hollow relief. Moreover, the court's ruling that a guardian can exer-
cise his ward's right of privacy is not entirely without support. In
Commonwealth v. Wiseman,"6 the Commonwealth, suing as parens
patriae, sought an injunction prohibiting the showing of a documen-
tary film depicting the inmates of a state mental institution in highly
personal and humiliating situations. The Commonwealth argued that
it had standing as the guardian of the inmates to enjoin the invasion
of their privacy. The court, in substantially granting the relief re-
quested, stated that the Commonwealth had a duty reasonably to
protect the inmates from violation of their privacy rights, and that
its standing in court was predicated solely upon this duty to assert
the wards' interests.17 Thus, while the rights of privacy being exer-
cised in Quinlan and Wiseman differ in origin and ultimate purpose,
Wiseman indicates that Quinlan is not the first case to authorize
third-party exercise of such personal rights. 8
Finally, the Quinlan court did not vest the guardian with unlim-
" 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969), noted in 83 HARV. L. REV. 1722 (1970).
" 249 N.E.2d at 615-16.
The standing of a third party to exercise an incompetent's right of privacy has
been sustained in situations where the violation of such right gives rise to liability in
tort to the incompetent person. This right of privacy springs not from a constitutional
basis, but rather from a common law right to be compensated for or equitably relieved
from a substantial or indecent intrusion upon the private life of a person. See Kalven,
Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROB.
326 (1966); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAUF. L. REv. 383 (1960); Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rv. 193 (1890). Some states have given. this right by
statute, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS § 51 (McKinney 1976), which provides for relief to "[a]
person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for advertising pur-
poses or for the purposes of trade without. . .written consent. ... The right is based
in tort law and relates primarily to the unauthorized publicizing or exploitation of an
individual's affairs. It is thus distinct from the constitutional right of privacy, although
as Quinlan and Wiseman illustrate, both rights have been held to be exercisable by a
guardian of the individual.
However, such an exercise should not be confused with cases where courts have
allowed recovery on the basis of a relational right of privacy theory to a parent, spouse,
or relative of a decedent whose privacy has been invaded. In such a case the plaintiff
is usually not attempting to recover for injury to the decedent's feelings or sensibilities,
but for his own injury. See Comment, Why Not a Relational Right of Privacy?-or
Right of Property?, 42 U. Mo.-KANs. CiTY L. Rav. 175, 181 (1973). An example is
Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930), where the court
allowed recovery to the parents of a deceased, deformed child whose photographs had
been published with defendant's permission. The court noted that any injury to the
child was not the basis for recovery; rather the right of action was owned by the parents
and did not depend on a survival of the child's right after his death. Id. at 260, 155
S.E. at 196.
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ited discretion to make the decision according to the dictates of his
own values and preferences; instead he is to render his best judgment
as to how Karen would decide in these circumstances." This formula-
tion would seem to allow for the consideration in future cases of
documents such as living wills " or antidysthanasia contracts7 as
355 A.2d at 664.
7 See Kutner, The Living Will-Coping With the Historical Event of Death, 27
BAYLOR L. Rv. 39 (1975); Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A
Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539 (1969); Note, Living Wills-Need for Legal Recognition, 78
W. VA. L. Rv. 370 (1976). The living will is a non-legal instrument indicating an
individual's desire not to be subjected to life-prolonging medical techniques in the
event of a terminal illness. It is signed by the patient and two witnesses, is usually
carried on his person, and is revocable by the signatory.
Recently, California enacted a Natural Death Act which gives legal effect to such
an instrument. California Natural Death Act, ASSEMBLY BmL No. 3060 (1976), to be
codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185 et. seq. (West Supp. 1977). When
executed by an adult patient "voluntarily and in sound mind" not less than 14 days
prior to being notified that his condition is "terminal," the directive expressly author-
izes the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures. The directive, signed
by the patient and two witnesses, is generally effective for five years unless revoked
by the signatory. "Terminal condition" is defined as:
an incurable condition caused by injury disease, or illness, which,
regardless of the application of life-sustaining procedures, would,
within reasonable medical judgment, produce death, and where the
application of life-sustaining procedures serve [sic] only to postpone
the moment of death of the patient.
§ 7187(f).
The bill further relieves physicians and hospitals from any civil or criminal liabil-
ity for withholding or withdrawing the life-sustaining procedures, but provides that a
failure by a physician to effectuate his patient's directive shall constitute unprofes-
sional conduct if he fails to transfer the patient to another physician who will comply
with the directive. If the patient becomes comatose, the directive shall remain in effect
for the duration of the comatose condition.
The authors of the bill based the right of an adult patient to make such a living
will upon "the dignity and privacy which patients have a right to expect," and ex-
pressly disavowed any intention of condoning, authorizing, or approving mercy killing
or any other affirmative act to end life in the absence of a directive. As Quinlan
illustrates, however, the absence of a living will does not mean that an individual's
constitutional right to die may not be effectuated, at least in New Jersey. If the patient
has not made a living will and is not competent to make the decision, under Quinlan
the guardian still may make the decision according to his best judgment as to how the
patient himself would decide.
11 The anti-dysthanasia proposal is for a binding legal contract between the pa-
tient and his physician (or hospital) which would obligate the latter to give effect to
an individual's expressed desire to die upon becoming terminally ill. The contract
could be executed before or after the patient becomes terminal, providing he is compe-
tent to enter into the agreement. Consideration is furnished by the doctor's promise
to perform and the patient's promise to pay for future services. Remedies for breach
would include damages for all medical fees and expenses incurred after the time at
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valid indicia of the patient's intentions, thereby minimizing the con-
cern expressed by some courts that decisions relating to the bodily
integrity of children or incompetents could be made by parents or
guardians without respect for the patient's wishes." Given the court's
ruling that since statements made by Karen prior to her incompe-
tency concerning her distaste for continuance of life by artificial
means were remote, impersonal, theoretical, and not made in a situa-
tion where Karen's own life was at stake, they were without probative
weight, 73 these documents would seem to be the only type of proba-
tive evidence admissible to show a patient's intent. Still, the decision
casts doubt on the reliability of even this type of evidence, since it
would seem subject to the same defects which the court found in
Karen's prior statements.
Thus, if there can be no cogent evidence of a patient's intentions,
or if none is available, 74 the conclusion is inescapable that in entrust-
ing the death-or-life decision to a guardian, the courts are allowing
him to make a value judgment concerning the quality of the life of
another person, and then giving legal protection to that judgment.
The consequences of such a decision will often be absolute and irrev-
ersible, but the Quinlan court decided that Karen's guardian must
be allowed to make the decision if the right of privacy was to have
any meaning at all. Based on extensive examination of the plaintiffs
motivations and beliefs, the court was confident that he was in the
best position to make the decision. 75 This essentially moral judgment
that the family unit7" constitutes the most appropriate forum for
which the signatory would have died absent life-prolonging treatment, as well as an
action for specific performance. See Comment, Antidysthanasia Contracts: A Proposal
for Legalizing Death With Dignity, 5 PAc. L.J. 738 (1974).
72 See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky. 1969) (Steinfeld, J., dissent-
ing).
73 355 A.2d at 653. Cf. In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill.2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442
(1965) (where statements considered because court concluded they were made with an
awareness of consequences). See also Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application
of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. Rav. 177 (1948).
7, One would assume that young and healthy people who become terminally ill as
the result of accident or unforeseeable circumstances generally would not have exe-
cuted living wills. Thus, that type of evidence probably will not play a controlling role
in cases such as Karen's, absent much wider use of such documents and more state
legislation to guarantee their effectiveness. See note 70 supra. Moreover, given the
court's characterization of such evidence as remote, theoretical, and without probative
weight, it would not be controlling. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
I After a comprehensive examination, the court concluded that Mr. Quinlan's
"strength of purpose and character" qualified him eminently for the guardianship of
his daughter. 355 A.2d at 671.
" In deciding to grant to Karen's father guardianship over the person of his daugh-
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decision should ensure that, in most cases, the guardian will have the
patient's best interests at heart. Further protection of the patient's
intentions is provided by the court's requirement that an Ethics
Committee, which would examine the motivations and good faith of
the parent or guardian requesting termination of care, approve any
decision to withdraw life-support treatment.
77
In ruling that the decision to refuse or to remove life-sustaining
treatment belonged to the patient in exercise of his right of privacy,
the supreme court rejected the trial court's holding that the decision
was solely a medical one .7 The Quinlan court, however, did not rule
that medical judgment was an unimportant consideration. Indeed, it
expressly held that whether there exists a situation in which a patient
may exercise his right to die depends on a medical prognosis "as to
the [patient's] reasonable possibility of return to cognitive and sapi-
ent life. . ... "" This interplay of the patient's constitutional right
with the duty and privilege of the treating physicians to act in accord-
ance with standard medical procedure" raises issues concerning the
interrelation of judicial and medical responsibility in cases of this
kind.
While according great deference to the importance of standard
medical procedure, the supreme court nonetheless promulgated a
new test for the applicability of such standards to specific situations
where the patient or his family are opposed to imposition or continua-
tion of treatment. It ruled that if an internal inconsistency exists
between the procedure required by the professional standard applica-
ble to a particular situation and what, in fact, doctors actually do in
these situations, then the standard would not bar exercise of the
ter, the supreme court noted that the state statute authorizing judicial appointment
of guardians, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:6-36 (West Supp. 1976), creates an initial presump-
tion of entitlement to guardianship of the next of kin. 355 A.2d at 670. This section
was designed to eliminate the former practice of New Jersey courts of commonly
appointing a friend of the court as guardian instead of the incompetent's next of kin.
See In re Roll, 117 N.J. Super. 122, 283 A.2d 764 (1971).
11 355 A.2d at 668-69. See text accompanying note 88 infra.
7R 137 N.J. Super. at 260, 348 A.2d at 818-19. The trial court stated that since the
duty of caring for terminally ill patients is imposed by society on physicians, there is
no justification for removing the decision-making power attendant to such duty from
the control of the medical profession. Therefore, the decision may be concurred in by
the parents or guardian of the incompetent but the final responsibility lies with the
physician, since the parents' motivations are always open to question.
7' 355 A.2d at 669.
The right of physicians to practice the profession of their choice, free from undue
interference by the state, has been accorded constitutional status. Young Women's
Christian Ass'n v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 (D.N.J. 1972).
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patient's right."' Thus, if there is evidence that physicians authorize
termination of life-support treatment without reference to this stan-
dard, then there is a lack of consistency within the medical profession
concerning when and how the standard should be applied, and under
the court's test the plaintiff should not be prevented from obtaining
relief.
In Quinlan, the court found this evidence in the admitted exist-
ence within the ambit of standard medical procedures of "judicious
neglect." Simply stated, the concept embodies an unwritten and un-
spoken practice among physicians to discontinue treatment of a pa-
tient when "it does not serve either the patient, the family, or society
in any meaningful way to continue treatment .... "82 The court rea-
soned that to discontinue treatment in some cases by resort to such
a practice, while refusing to disconnect the respirator in Karen's case
because technically she was not brain dead,3 did not follow an inter-
nally consistent medical methodology, especially since judicious neg-
lect is practiced in many cases where patients are clearly not brain
dead.84
In spite of its conclusion that the asserted medical standards did
not bar the relief which the plaintiff sought, the court's decision
should not overly intrude into the physician's traditional realm of
medical ethics and expertise. First, the formulation of the prognosis
as to a possible return by the patient to cognitive and sapient life
remains a uniquely medical function, and that prognosis constitutes
the crucial factor in determining whether the patient's claim of a
right to die will override the state's interest in protecting his life?,
Second, the court was cognizant of the doctor's dilemma as evi-
denced by the two undesirable consequences that might flow from a
physician's participation in removal of life-support treatment: possi-
ble civil or criminal liability and a perceived violation of the doctor's
ethical duty to heal and sustain life. Taking into account the high
standard of respect that this duty commands,8 the court specifically
"1 355 A.2d at 666.
82 Id. at 657 (testimony of Dr. Julius Korein). The same concept is given effect
when, in a notation, the physician writes the three initials "D.N.R."-do not resusci-
tate. Id.
For a discussion of the concept of brain death, see note 9 supra.
,' 355 A.2d at 667.
See text beginning at note 55 supra.
" 355 A.2d at 668. The court noted that physicians alone are charged with the
duty of making ethical judgments in the course of practice that others are ill-equipped
to make. This ethical duty not only requires doctors to exercise good faith judgment
in very difficult and uncertain situations, but also imposes upon physicians a civil or
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relieved Karen's physicians and hospitals from all such liability. 7 In
recognition of this solicitude towards the physicians' problems and
the heavy reliance placed upon medical prognosis and participation
in the decision-making process, In re Quinlan should not be regarded
as a vindication of the personal freedom to do with oneself as one
wishes in derogation of medical conscience and practice. Instead, the
decision illustrates the exacting delineation necessary to outline the
appropriate zones of judicial and medical responsibility.
To insure that any decision by the guardian and the treating
physicians to remove life-sustaining treatment is grounded in a sound
medical prognosis and a moral judgment consistent with the patient's
own desires, the court required the involvement of an Ethics Commit-
tee as a consultative body for the purpose of reviewing the decision.,
The court suggested that the Committee consist of physicians, social
workers, theologians, and attorneys89 who would examine the medical
correctness of the prognosis, the motives of the interested parties, and
the advisability of implementing the decision to withdraw the life-
prolonging treatment.
This approach has several advantages." The moral responsibility
for making such an awesome judgment is shared by persons other
than the guardian and the treating physicians.2 Thorough examina-
criminal liability that they frequently do not even realize as a factor in the decision-
making process. See also AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETH-
ics, reprinted in W. CURRAN & E. SHAPIRO, LAW, MEDICINE AND FORENSIC SCIENCE (2d
ed. 1970).
See text accompanying note 95 infra.
0 355 A.2d at 668-69. The impetus for the court's adoption of the Ethics Commit-
tee concept came from a proposal in Teel, The Physician's Dilemma: A Doctor's View:
What the Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 6 (1975).[Hereinafter cited as Teel.]
" The court noted that this conception of the precise organization of the Commit-
tee, which was Dr. Teel's, see Teel, supra note 88, at 8-9, would not have to be
specifically implemented; a "reasonable counterpart" would be equally effective. 355
A.2d at 669.
" In a case where the patient himself competently made the decision, the Com-
mittee's task presumably would be largely limited to confirming the soundness of the
medical prognosis, since the need for investigation of the parent or guardian's ethical
motivations would not be present.
" See generally Teel, supra note 88, at 9.
3 Since the Committee would serve only in an advisory capacity, it presumably
would lack the legal status that would permit it to be held liable in a civil or criminal
action based on wrongful death or otherwise. The eventual assumption by the Commit-
tee of such a legal posture is not foreclosed, however, if its members accept such a
responsibility in recognition of the usefulness of such a body's function and the respect
it hopefully will command from physicians, patients, and parents. See Teel, supra note
88, at 9. Even if the Committee retains its present advisory capacity, its final decision
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tion and exploration of all issues and facets of particular cases is
facilitated. Furthermore, any evidence of "doctor-shopping" on the
part of the guardian would be closely scrutinized and considered.1
3
Finally, this method permits removing the decision-making proce-
dure from the judicial forum. 4 The supreme court incorporated the
Ethics Committee requirement in its final holding in Quinlan, where
Chief Justice Hughes stated that upon the concurrence of Karen's
guardian, should Karen's physicians conclude that there is no reason-
able chance of Karen's recovering to a cognitive and sapient state, the
hospital Ethics Committee must agree with the conclusions of the
physicians and family before the present life-support system may be
withdrawn. Once the Ethics Committee gives its approval, "[the]
said action shall be without any civil or criminal liability therefor on
approving or rejecting the guardian's application for termination of care is necessary
and binding. See text accompanying note 95 infra.
93 Since Karen's guardian was given the express power to appoint her attending
physicians, 355 A.2d at 671, it would seem that the court could not help but realize
that the decision would permit a guardian to procure selectively the services of doctors
whose prognoses would permit the carrying out of the guardian's wishes despite strong
opposition from family members or the state. However, the Ethics Committee would
investigate the factual bases of the prognosis and would not approve the decision if
the prognosis were not in accord with sound medical judgment. Since Committee
approval must be obtained if the patient's right to have the treatment withdrawn is
to be exercised, this would provide a strong deterrent. Nevertheless, if doubt remained
as to the propriety of a decision, the court emphasized that the judicial forum would
remain open as the appropriate vehicle for resolution of the conflict. 355 A.2d at 669.
11 The Quinlan court noted its perception of the judicial forum as inappropriate
in cases of this kind, stating that "a practice of applying to a court to confirm such
decisions would generally be inappropriate, not only because that would be a gratui-
tous encroachment upon the medical profession's field of competence, but because it
would be impossibly cumbersome." 355 A.2d at 669. See Powell v. Columbian Presby-
terian Medical Center, 39 Misc.2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450, 452 (1965).
One commentator on Quinlan has taken the position that due to the limitations
of the judicial approach, the question of determining whether to permit termination
of care is better left to the legislature, which is more able to determine the social policy
involved in deciding if human life should in all cases be preserved. Note, The Tragic
Choice: Termination of Care for Patients in a Permanent Vegetative State, 51 N.Y.
U.L. REv. 285 (1976). It does not follow, however, that courts, notwithstanding their
capacity to adjudicate individual conflicts, should not declare the nature and extent
of the patient's right to refuse care. Even if the court's result is later modified or
repudiated by the legislature, this possibility should not deter the court from accepting
and deciding cases in new areas of social welfare. The type of "judicial activism"
evidenced by the New Jersey Supreme Court should not be seen as a usurpation of the
legislature's job; rather, the court's decision represents an attempt to reach a final
disposition of the issues as befits its role as an institution that truly resolves grievances.
See White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and
Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 300 (1973).
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the part of any participant, whether guardian, physician, hospital or
others."95
By providing a non-judicial mechanism for reviewing the pro-
priety of an individual's decision to die, the court eliminated the
substantial formalities attendant to a legal proceeding. Such an ap-
proach is more flexible and responsive to the extra-legal factors in-
volved in any decision to reject or withdraw life-support treatment.
Moreover, the basis of the decision in Quinlan evolves not only from
an affirmance of the patient's constitutional rights, but also from the
practice of the medical profession concerning judicious neglect" and
an express belief by the court that society in general would support
Mr. Quinlan's prayer for relief.9 7 The judicial system has no particu-
lar expertise in the determination of these latter two factors. Further-
more, a medical situation which is subject to change at any time
requires day-to-day observation and decision-making. A condition
regarded as irreversible today might become more hopeful tomorrow.
In such circumstances, the court's need to decide issues based on
facts existing at the time of suit precludes the type of continuous,
realistic reappraisal that is essential.
In re Quinlan represents the New Jersey Supreme Court's sincere
effort to resolve one of the most complex dilemmas of modern so-
ciety-the moral and legal rectitude of a decision to withdraw life-
prolonging medical treatment from an irreversibly dying patient.
Sustaining a claim by the patient's parents that they be allowed to
exercise Karen's constitutional right of privacy, the court recognized
that this right contemplates the ability of the patient to refuse life-
support mechanisms when faced with no possibility of recovery or
return to meaningful existence. The court further acknowledged the
importance of the standards and conscience of the medical profession
when confronted with this problem, but emphasized that the inviola-
bility of medical judgments and procedures must give way in certain
circumstances to the exercise of the patient's constitutional rights.
The opinion should not be read as destroying or minimizing the
traditional legal presumption in favor of life.9" Such is not its import,
" 355 A.2d at 671.
" See text accompanying note 82 supra.
" 355 A.2d at 664. The court stated that it thought Mr. Quinlan's decision to seek
termination of the processes keeping his daughter alive should be accepted by society
in general, whose members would, when faced with similar circumstances, react in the
same way.
" Cf. Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000, 1009-10 (D.C. Cir. 1964), where an order for a blood transfusion was required
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especially in view of its recognition of the inherent limitations of the
court as a forum for resolving questions concerning the quality and
meaning of life. While the relative paucity of in-depth constitutional
analysis might suggest that the court first made a moral judgment
as to the propriety of sanctioning a person's death and then searched
for the constitutional authority to support its conclusion, such a
method of decision-making is not necessarily suspect. There was no
substantial precedent from which to derive guidance and support,
and the court recognized that the problem in its final analysis is not
a legal one. Nonetheless, the court considered all issues and appre-
ciated the import of what it was called upon to decide. In the context
of the tragic case that confronted it, the court's effort is a humble
attempt to provide a legal solution, however flawed, to a problem that
defies easy or correct resolution."
DAVID P. FALCK
if the patient was not to die. Judge Wright stated that "[tihe final, and compelling,
reason for granting the emergency writ was that a life hung in the balance. There was
no time for research and reflection'. . . I determined to act on the side of life."
1g Since Quinlan was handed down three cases have granted similar relief in
situations involving the withholding of life-support treatment: Dockery v. Dockery,
No. 51439 (Hamilton County Ch. Ct. Tenn., Feb. 11, 1977); In re Cain, File No. 76-
130-95 (Duval County Ct. Fla., Dec. 6, 1976); Jones v. Saikewicz, No. S.J.C.-711 (Sup.
Jud. Ct. Mass., July 9, 1976). Dockery and Cain are unreported trial court decisions
which are expected to be appealed. Saikewicz was disposed of by an order of the court;
an opinion is expected but was unavailable at the time of this writing.
